Counterfactual accounts of Causation
Counterfactual accounts assert that, if C had not happened, E would
not have. That is, C is a necessary condition for E. C can
occur without E, but E cannot occur unless C does.
These accounts seem to be the most popular at the moment, but
they can get very, very technical and involved.
Literature
The most important paper on the subject is Lewis 1973. The postscript
to this paper in Lewis
1986a is three times as long as the paper itself, but covers
many of the issues arising for such accounts.
Other discussions can be found in Kim 1973, Horwich 1987, and Bennett 1987.
Problems
Common Cause
It can be argued that, if C causes both E and F, then if E doesn't
happen, that means C didin't happen, so F won't happen either. This
means that the counterfactual account gives the wrong answer.
Overdetermination
If C doesn't happen, D will go on to cause E, so it is not true
that if C hadn't happened, E wouldn't have, so C doesn't cause E.
This is also the wrong answer.
Probabilistic Causation
Lewis's account of counterfactuals breaks badly once probabilistic
events are allowed in, so that the whole theory has problems.
Copyright David Chart 1998