Concepts of Explanation
The conceptions of explanation are not theories of explanation, and
a given concept may be consistent with many theories, and vice
versa. Indeed, a good theory will capture aspects of all the
conceptions, thus explaining why they all have some intuitive pull.
Reason
An explanation gives us a reason to believe in the truth of the
explanandum. This was Hempel's official
position.
Sometimes, however, the only reason we have to believe the
explanation is that we know the explanandum is true (e.g. the
recession explanation for the red shift of galactic spectra).
Familiarity
An explanation makes the unfamiliar and surprising explanandum
familiar to us.
However, we often explain familiar things, such as the blue of
the sky, in unfamiliar terms, such as the differential scattering
of different wavelengths of light from microscopic particles.
Unification
An explanation unifies our knowledge of the explanandum with our
knowledge of other things. This is tightly linked to unification models of explanation.
It is difficult to say what, exactly, unification involves.
Necessity
An explanation enables us to see why the explanandum had
to be the case.
There are problems with the possibility of probabilistic explanation.
Causal
We explain something by giving its causes. This is closely linked
to the causal model of
explanation.
Some explanations do not seem to be causal, e.g. explanations in
mathematics.
Understanding
An explanation is anything that improves our understanding. See Matthews 1981.
Unfortunately, we do not have a good account of understanding at
present.
Copyright David Chart 1997